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OPINION1 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S.Ct. 756 (1974) 
(“American Pipe”), the Supreme Court established a class action tolling rule providing 
for tolling of the time for bringing lawsuits by unnamed members of a class in a putative 
class action during the time that a district court was deciding whether to certify the  
plaintiff class.  In the cases now before us on Merck and Co.’s (“Merck”) and Merck and 
Co. as successor to Schering Plough Pharmaceuticals’s (“Schering”) (together 
“appellants”) consolidated appeals, we determine whether, in this action that GIC Private 
Limited and North Sound Capital LLC (“appellees”) and other plaintiffs brought under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) against appellants, the American 
Pipe rule can be applied to toll the time for bringing actions otherwise beyond the time 
allowed by statutes of repose.  It is undisputed that, in the absence of tolling, appellees’ 
actions would be untimely as appellees initiated their cases beyond that time.  It is now 
clear that in the light of California Public Employees Retirement System v. ANZ 
Securities, Inc., No. 16-373, S.Ct. ____ (June 26, 2017), that the American Pipe tolling  
rule cannot be invoked to toll the running of time under the statutes of repose at issue in 
these cases and that appellees’ Exchange Act claims therefore were untimely.  
Accordingly, we will reverse an order that the District Court entered on August 26, 2015, 
denying appellants’ motions to dismiss appellees’ Exchange Act cases and will remand 
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the cases to the District Court to dismiss appellees’ cases insofar as they assert Exchange 
Act claims. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78aa, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337, and 1367.  Merck and Merck as successor 
to Schering filed a timely motion in the District Court seeking certification for appeal of 
the statute of repose questions that the District Court addressed in entering the August 26, 
2015 order.  On January 7, 2016, that Court granted the motion and certified its August 
26, 2015 order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  After the 
District Court granted their motion, appellants filed a timely petition in this Court for 
leave to appeal, which we granted on February 11, 2016.2  Consequently, we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  See, e.g., Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 
819 F.3d 61, 62 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016).  We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s 
denial of appellants’ motions to dismiss.  See Keystone Redevelopment Partners, LLC v. 
Decker, 631 F.3d 89, 95 (3d Cir. 2011).   
III. BACKGROUND3 
A. The ENHANCE Trial 
 
                                              
2 There are additional appellants but it is adequate for us to refer only to Merck and 
Merck as successor to Schering as the appellants.  Of course, our opinion reversing 
applies to all appellants. 
 
3 The District Court primarily relied on the allegations in North Sound Capital’s 
complaint filed on November 14, 2013.  We, too, will rely on North Sound’s allegations 
in this opinion.  In any event, the individual complaints filed in the actions now on appeal 
are “extremely similar.”  (JA 6 n.2). 
 
7 
 
 In 2002, Merck and Schering entered into a joint venture for the purpose of 
combining their cholesterol treating drugs, respectively Zocor and Zetia, to create a new 
pharmaceutical product called “Vytorin.”4  In furtherance of this venture, Merck and 
Schering designed a clinical trial known as ENHANCE to demonstrate the benefits of 
Vytorin.  In particular, Merck and Schering expected that the ENHANCE trial would 
establish that Vytorin simultaneously could lower LDL cholesterol levels and reduce the 
intima-media thickness of the carotid arterial wall.  (JA 85, ¶ 41).   
 The ENHANCE trial ran from August 2002 to August 2006 but was unsuccessful.  
According to appellees, notwithstanding the hurdles attributable to ENHANCE’s 
experimental design, appellants allegedly misrepresented Vytorin’s prospects for clinical 
efficacy.  Appellees claim that appellants made 17 misrepresentations concerning 
Vytorin, the last by Schering on November 19, 2007, and by Merck on January 30, 2008.  
They also allege that an individual defendant made sales of Schering stock based on 
insider knowledge of the results of ENHANCE, the last insider transaction having been 
on May 1, 2007.   
 The final results of the ENHANCE trial became public between January and 
March 2008 and the ENHANCE data indicated that Vytorin did not produce any added 
benefit when compared to Zocor alone.  Indeed, according to appellees, researchers 
characterized Vytorin’s active ingredient as an “expensive placebo.”  (JA 132, ¶ 142).  
                                              
4 Merck and Schering completed a merger in November 2009 in which Schering became 
a part of Merck.  (JA 73, ¶ 21).  Thus, Merck and Merck as successor to Schering Plough 
are appellants on this appeal.   
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Appellees assert that in the period immediately following the release of these results, 
Schering’s “common stock price fell more than 52%, wiping out more than $23.63 billion 
in market capitalization, and the . . . preferred stock price similarly fell more than 40% . . 
. wiping out $1.039 billion in market capitalization.”  (JA 216, ¶ 320) (emphasis in the 
original).   
B. The Class Actions 
  
 After the results of ENHANCE became public in 2008, representative plaintiffs 
filed two putative class actions related to the test’s failure, one against Merck and one 
against Schering.  See In re Schering-Plough Corp./ENHANCE Sec. Litig., No. 2:08-cv-
00397 (DMC) (JAD), 2012 WL 4482032 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2012) (“Schering Class 
Action”); In re Merck & Co., Vytorin/Zetia Sec. Litig., No. 2:08-cv-02177 (DMC) 
(JAD), 2012 WL 4482041 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2012) (“Merck Class Action”).  The District 
Court certified classes in both cases on September 25, 2012.  See Schering Class Action, 
2012 WL 4482032, at *1; Merck Class Action, 2012 WL 4482041, at *1.  On December 
28, 2012, the Court approved notices to be given to members of the proposed classes, 
and, in both cases permitted class members to opt-out of the classes until March 1, 2013.  
Ultimately the parties settled the class actions.   
C. Appellees Opt-Out of the Class 
 Appellees North Sound Capital LLC and GIC Private Limited, both institutional 
investors, who were within the classes in the underlying actions, timely opted-out of the 
classes on March 1, 2013.  Then appellees initiated four district court actions against 
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appellants on November 14, 2013, and January 14, 2014.5  In their essentially identical 
complaints, appellees alleged that appellants violated §§ 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the 
Exchange Act, and engaged in common law fraud actionable under New Jersey law.  
Specifically, appellees allege that they, or their investment managers, relied on 
appellants’ misrepresentations when they purchased Schering securities during the 
ENHANCE trial and that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of [appellants’] wrongful 
conduct, [appellees] suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and 
sales of [Schering’s] securities during the [r]elevant [p]eriod.”  (JA 225, ¶ 346).  
Appellees also allege that an individual defendant, other than Merck and Merck as 
successor to Schering, engaged in a series of insider sales of Schering stock.  (JA 410-11, 
¶¶ 351-52).  As we already have stated, the last alleged insider trade was executed on 
May 1, 2007, and the final alleged misstatement was made on January 30, 2008, more 
than five years before appellees initiated their individual actions. (JA 410-11, ¶¶ 351-52; 
JA 744-45, ¶¶ 317-18).  
D. Appellants’ Motions to Dismiss and Petitions for Interlocutory Review 
 
 On November 17, 2014, appellants moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to 
dismiss all four of appellees’ post-opt-out-cases.6  In support of their motions, appellants 
                                              
5 Two of the actions were against Merck in its own capacity and two were against Merck 
as successor to Schering.  Appellants characterize the complaints in these actions as copy 
cats of the class actions. 
 
6 The District Court initially stayed the four actions after the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Police & Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit v. IndyMac MBS, 
Inc., 721 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2013), a case dealing with the issue of the applicability of 
American Pipe’s class action tolling rule to statutes of repose.  See Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. 
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asserted that the five-year period for bringing actions that the statutes of repose set forth 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) for claims under §§ 10(b) and 20(a), and 15 U.S.C. § 78t-
1(b)(4) for claims under § 20A, barred appellees’ Exchange Act actions because 
appellees brought their actions after the expiration of the five-year period.  Appellants 
argued that American Pipe did not save appellees’ cases because American Pipe applied 
to “equitable” tolling of statutes of limitation and was not a precedent for extending the 
time for initiating actions barred by statutes of repose.  Appellants also argued that even 
if American Pipe tolling applied a form of “legal,” as distinguished from “equitable” 
tolling, the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), precluded the application 
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on which the District Court relied in denying appellants’ motions to 
dismiss to extend the time for commencing actions under the Exchange Act statutes of 
repose.7  (JA 9).  
 Appellees, in opposing dismissal of their actions in the District Court, asserted that 
the Exchange Act time limitations are statutes of limitations rather than statutes of repose 
                                                                                                                                                  
of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1515 (2014).  The Supreme Court ultimately 
dismissed its grant of certiorari as improvident, and proceedings in the cases now before 
us resumed in the District Court.  See Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, 
Inc., 135 S.Ct. 42 (2014).  
 
7 In their motions to dismiss, appellants also argued that the District Court should decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over appellees’ common law fraud claims, or, in the 
alternative, that appellees insufficiently pled the fraud claims.  Inasmuch as the District 
Court held that appellees’ Exchange Act claims survived the motions to dismiss, the 
Court did not rule on the jurisdictional argument and it limited its analysis of the common 
law fraud claims to appellants’ inadequate-pleading argument, which it rejected.  We do 
not review this conclusion because it is not within the scope of the issues we have 
certified for appeal.  On the remand that will follow the disposition of these appeals, the 
District Court may consider the question of whether it should exercise jurisdiction over 
the common law claims, a matter on which we do not express an opinion.     
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and thus the limitations periods in the statutes could be equitably tolled.  Appellees 
further contended that, even if the Exchange Act time limitations are statutes of repose, 
there could be tolling under American Pipe in these cases because the tolling in American 
Pipe had a “legal” foundation rooted in an interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.  
Accordingly, appellees contended that there was a statutory basis for the tolling.  Finally, 
appellees argued that the REA did not preclude extending American Pipe tolling to 
statutes of repose.  
 On August 26, 2015, the District Court denied appellants’ motions to dismiss.  The 
Court first concluded that the time limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) and 15 U.S.C. § 
78t-1(b)(4) are statutes of repose and that, in the absence of tolling, the time for bringing 
appellees’ Exchange Act actions expired before appellees opted-out of the class actions 
and subsequently initiated their individual actions.  The Court, however, determined that 
it could apply American Pipe tolling to the Exchange Act repose periods as it accepted 
appellees’ contention that American Pipe tolling has a “legal” foundation.  It reached this 
conclusion on the bases of its interpretation of Rule 23 and its conclusion that American 
Pipe was applicable to statutes of repose.  The Court then addressed the impact of the 
REA and reasoned that American Pipe tolling is purely procedural and therefore 
American Pipe could be applicable as tolling under that case had only an incidental 
impact on the parties’ substantive rights.  Accordingly, the Court applied American Pipe 
tolling to appellees’ individual actions brought after they opted-out of the class actions 
following the class actions’ certification.  The Court therefore held that appellees’ 
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Exchange Act claims were timely and it denied appellants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss.8  
 As we set forth above, appellants filed a motion in the District Court seeking an 
order certifying the statute of repose questions to this Court for appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b).  The District Court granted appellants’ motion on January 7, 2016, and 
certified the following two questions for interlocutory review: 
1. Whether the tolling rule set forth in American Pipe & 
 Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) is ‘legal’ or 
 ‘equitable’ in nature; 
 
2. Whether interpreting American Pipe & Constr. Co. 
 v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) tolling to extend the five-
 year statutes of repose under the Securities Exchange 
 Act of 1934 would abridge [appellant]s’ substantive 
 rights, enlarge [appellee]s’ substantive rights, or 
 otherwise modify any substantive right within the 
 meaning of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
 2072(b)[.] 
 
(JA 34).  After the District Court entered the above order, appellants petitioned this Court 
for leave to file an interlocutory appeal and we granted their petition pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) on February 11, 2016.  In our order we accepted the District Court’s 
framing of the questions for the appeal. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
 When this case was before the District Court the outcome was not obvious.  But 
that was before the Supreme Court decided ANZ Securities.  After the Court decided that 
                                              
8 Appellants do not contend that even if tolling applied, appellees’ actions would be 
untimely. 
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case we directed the parties to inform us by letter with respect to their positions 
concerning the impact of that case on this case.  Appellees have stated that ANZ made 
clear that American Pipe recognized a form of “equitable tolling that does not apply to 
the federal securities laws’ statutes of repose.  Because this is the precise question at issue 
in [these consolidated appeals], we believe that the Supreme Court’s decision is 
dispositive of the issues raised in Defendants’ appeals.”  Letter of Daniel Hume of Kirby 
McInerney LLP dated July 6, 2017.  Not surprisingly, appellants have filed a letter taking 
the same position. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s order of August 26, 
2015, denying appellants’ motions to dismiss appellees’ Exchange Act claims, and will 
remand the cases to that Court for it to dismiss the Exchange Act claims as time-barred, 
and for further proceedings on the remaining issues. 
 
